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What Is Wrong with Kant’s Four Examples
Nelson Potter 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Abstract
Kant gives four examples to illustrate the application of the cat-
egorical imperative immediately after introducing its “universal 
law” formulation in Chapter Two his Groundwork of the Metaphys-
ics of Morals. These examples have been much discussed to gain an 
understanding of how the categorical imperative applies to derive 
specific duties. It is argued that the discussions found in these ex-
amples do not accord well with Kant’s fuller account of that appli-
cation in his later work The Metaphysics of Morals. That [later] work 
has quite different, sometimes better, arguments for the same moral 
conclusions, and never mentions the argument against making a 
lying promise (the second example). Giving exclusive or excessive 
attention to these four examples has distorted our understanding of 
Kant’s moral philosophy.
I
For a good many years there has been a great concentration on the four 
examples of the application of the categorical imperative that Kant gives 
us in the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, immediately after he in-
troduces the “universal law” formulation of the categorical imperative in 
Chapter Two. Perhaps it all started with C. D. Broad’s discussion of Kant 
in Five Types of Ethical Theory.1 When Robert Paul Wolff’s well known an-
thology of writings on Kant first appeared some 25 years ago, five of the 
eight essays there on Kant’s ethics were at least in part concerned with 
giving an explication or critique of these four examples.2 Many textbook 
discussions of Kant center around Kant’s arguments for the four exam-
ples (e.g., Hospers, Feldman); as a result whole generations of students 
have been taught Kant based on what he shows or fails to show about the 
meaning and applicability of the categorical imperative in the famous four 
examples.3 In this literature friends of Kant have usually tried to defend 
his reasoning in the four examples, and those hostile to his general views 
have criticized it. 
In this paper I wish to take a different approach, and, although I will 
mention a few points of criticism, mainly I wish to urge that these famous 
few paragraphs do not very well state or reflect Kant’s more considered 
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and detailed discussions of these same issues in other ethical works of his 
critical period, especially The Metaphysics of Morals. Thus, they are not a 
very reliable guide to Kant’s views on the application of the categorical 
imperative. After I discuss each of the four examples as presented after 
the “universal law” formulation, I will also discuss (1) the reprise of these 
examples after the second formulation, concerning respect of persons (G, 
IV, 427-430).4 This coverage of the same four examples has been much less 
discussed than the presentation of these examples after the first formula-
tion (G, IV, 421-3). Finally, (2) I will discuss what Kant has to say about 
similar duties in the Doctrine of Virtue (Tugendlehre) part of the Metaphys-
ics of Morals. I conclude that we should give the famous four examples 
in their first occurrence, just after the first formulation of the categorical 
imperative, a much needed rest, and learn to look elsewhere in addition 
to, and sometimes in place of, these examples to discern Kant’s views on 
the application of the categorical imperative. 
There is another line of criticism of the emphasis on the four examples 
that I believe is correct, but which I will not try to defend here. It is as fol-
lows: If we take the four examples discussion as quite important or central 
to Kant’s moral philosophy, we are typically at least making the assump-
tion that the examples are the endpoint and goal of Kant’s introduction 
and presentation of the categorical imperative in the Grundlegung, i.e., that 
Kant’s moral philosophy is in the first instance a deontological theory of 
morally right or wrong action, perhaps after the model of W. D. Ross or 
H. A. Prichard. This is the interpretation of Kant as a pure deontological 
formalist. It is this line of interpretation that makes many practitioners of 
virtue ethics view Kant as an enemy. Again, I do believe that this common 
line of interpretation is incorrect, but I will not be directly criticizing it 
here. Rather, insofar as this interpretation is based on an assumption of 
the centrality of the four examples, I will be indirectly undermining it. 
My procedure will be next, in II, to make some general remarks about 
the argumentative structure and intentions of the Grundlegung as a whole. 
Then I will discuss the four examples in the order 1, 3, 2, 4, in order to 
discuss the two examples of duties to oneself together (1 and 3 in III, fol-
lowed by 2 and 4 in IV). For each discussion, after presenting and com-
menting on Kant’s initial presentation after the universal law formulation, 
I will contrast it with both the reprise of the example following the second 
formulation, and the fuller discussion of the example in the Tugendlehre, 
when there is one. Finally, in Part V I will draw some general conclusions 
from these discussions.
II 
In this section I wish to make two general points about the Grundlegung 
as a whole. The first relates to Kant’s general intention in this small book, 
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the first work on ethics from Kant’s critical period. In the introduction 
Kant, after telling us that he intends to devote a later work to the applica-
tion of the categorical imperative, a work to be entitled Metaphysics of Mor-
als (a work actually published in 1798), writes as follows about the limited 
purpose of the present work:
The sole aim of the present Groundwork is to seek out and establish 
the supreme principle of morality. This by itself is a business which by 
its very purpose constitutes a whole and has to be separated offfrom 
every other enquiry. The application of the principle to the whole sys-
tem would no doubt throw much light on my answers to this cen-
tral question....All the same, I had to forego this advantage, which in 
any case would be more flattering to myself than to others, since the 
convenience of a principle in use and its seeming adequacy afford no 
completely safe proof of its correctness. (G, IV, 392) 
After this statement it might seem surprising that Kant even included his 
four examples, for this statement suggests that the Grundlegung wiIl con-
tain no information about application. And yet it makes sense to include 
at least a few examples of applications. Otherwise it may seem that the 
categorical imperative, especially in its first “universal law” formulation, 
might have no applications at all, and it might seem unspeakably mysteri-
ous and abstract without at least a few suggestions about its application. 
So I suggest that it was as a result of a sort ofcompromise with the com-
mon understanding that the examples were there at all. They are meant 
to be just what Kant says they are: examples, intended to give merely a 
brief and preliminary indication of how such applications will go, and, as 
Duncan argued, they provide a kind of interlude to the main argument of 
the Grundlegung. Hence, Kant has himself given us an indication that the 
four examples are not to be taken too seriously, and he has told us that the 
place to look, if one wishes to understand the application of the categori-
cal imperative is to the planned Metaphysics of Morals. 
The second point I wish to make about the Grundlegung as a whole is 
that in a number of other respects it appears that when Kant wrote it he 
did not have his system of moral philosophy entirely worked out. There 
are some departures from the doctrine and terminology of the later works 
on moral philosophy, to a much greater degree than can be found among 
those other later works in relation to each other (I have in mind primarily 
the second Critique, the Religion, and the Metaphysics of Morals). Here are 
some instances to illustrate this: (1) Kant apparently almost immediately 
undertook to revise the doctrine and proof of freedom that was offered 
in Chapter Three of the Grundlegung, having quickly become dissatis-
fied with it. The new version appeared quickly in the second Critique.5 (2) 
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There are anumber of doctrines and points of terminology that appear in 
the Groundwork that are never used later. The terminology of “objective 
ends” and “ends in themselves” is seldom if ever used in the later works, 
though this change of language may not reflect any doctrinal change. (3) 
The very doctrine of three formulations of the categorical imperative, for-
mulations which Kant tells us are equivalent to each other, receives little 
to no confirmation in later works. (4) The terminology for “motives” or 
“incentives” changes, and the terminology of the Grundlegung is not ad-
hered to later on. There are possible explanations available in some of 
these cases which are adequate to explain away any such shift. But when 
we put all of these differences together, I conclude that the Grundlegung 
is more different from Kant’s later works in moral philosophy than those 
later works are from each other. The differences among the later works 
can often be accounted for simply in terms of the fact that each of them is 
taking up different topics. If Kant later revised some of his views, this is 
another reason for not taking the Grundlegung as the sole or even the most 
reliable or most important text in understanding Kant’s views.
III 
Now let us consider each of the examples in turn from G, IV, 421-3, 
bringing out the limitations and inadequacies of each of the examples, 
regarded as representative arguments for moral applications of what Kant 
takes to be the basic moral principle. I’m not primarily interested here 
in philosophical critiques of the arguments themselves, something which 
many others have attempted before me, but some criticisms will be made 
in the process of interpretation, and as an adjunct to interpretation. The 
“what is wrong” from my title that I wish to show, is not primarily philo-
sophical inadequacy of the application arguments, but unhelpfulness for 
developing a general interpretation of Kant’s views on the application of 
the categorical imperative. 
We turn now to Examples One and Three, the two examples of duties 
to oneself. 
(1) For the first example, where the agent is considering suicide, the 
proposed maxim is mentioned, “From self-love I make it my principle 
to shorten my life if its continuance threatens more evil than it promises 
pleasure.” (G, V, 422) Kant tells us that this maxim is not a possible law of 
nature: “It is seen at once that a system of nature by whose law the very 
same feeling whose function (Bestimmung) is to stimulate the furtherance 
of life should actually destroy life would contradict itself and consequent-
ly could not subsist as a system of nature.” (G, IV, 422)
This seems not a very satisfactory argument. For one thing, there doesn’t 
seem to be any contradiction in a natural impulse that now pushes us to 
do one thing, and at another moment something quite different. The im-
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pulse to avoid uncomfortable temperatures one time has me moving out 
of the hot sun, and later (next winter) covering myself with clothes to keep 
warm. Or the impulse of thirst, which at one moment moves me to seek 
out drink, once satiated moves me to refuse offers of drink. 
Perhaps Kant’s claim is more plausible if the law in question is regarded 
as a purely teleological law, one which mentions the purpose of a given 
organ, function, or ability. In a teleological system perhaps it would be cor-
rect that a given faculty or impulse could not have contrary purposive 
outcomes within that singular system, and still be such a law. The teleo-
logical law here would be something like: “The natural end of the feeling 
of self-love is the promotion of life in the agent.” 
Here in an interlude mostly confined to the present paragraph, I indulge 
in some philosophical critique of this view, a brief departure from the 
above expressed resolve to abstain. The claim that there are such teleologi-
cal natural laws seems hard to defend. Such laws seem to mix together the 
functions of explanation and value justification. And even if we do posit 
such laws, there still seem to be problems with plurality of ends, or of can-
didate ends. For example, is the natural end of the sexual faculty (a) repro-
duction, (b) experience of sexual pleasure, (c) expression of sexual love, or 
is it some combination? In an ethical theory based on natural ends, differ-
ent answers to this question will produce different recommendations for 
behavior. If even some of Kant’s applications of the categorical imperative 
(Paton said all)6 require the use of teleological laws, that is an outcome 
more difficult to defend than the categorical imperative itself. Also, if such 
laws play an essential role in application arguments, they arguably pre-
empt the universal law principle itself as the substantive moral principle 
that is the source of the specific obligation; the universal law requirement 
begins to seem like a fifth wheel. Finally, there seems little prospect of 
using arguments with teleological premises to arrive at uniquely correct 
moral conclusions. So if this were the correct way to understand Kant’s 
views on the application of the categorical imperative, then this part of his 
theory can probably be described as of historical interest only. 
However, when we turn to the Metaphysics of Morals, we see that the teleo-
logical version of the argument against suicide is entirely abandoned, and 
a different, and more defensible argument is presented:
Man cannot renounce his personality as long as he is a subject of duty, 
hence as long as he lives; and it is a contradiction that he should be 
authorized to withdraw from all obligation, that is, freely to act as if 
no authorization were needed for this action. To annihilate the subject 
of morality in one’s own person is to root out of existence morality 
itself from the world, as far as one can, even though morality is an end 
in itself. Consequently, disposing of oneself as a mere means to some 
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discretionary end is debasing humanity in one’s person (homo nou-
menon), to which man (homo phenomenon) was nevertheless entrusted 
for preservation. (MdS, VI, 422-3)
This argument can be elucidated with a partially analogous example. 
Suppose that Jones, who has been working hard to achieve a certain im-
portant political reform, and who has gathered many others to work with 
her on behalf of this cause, suddenly withdraws from the effort because 
she decides that she was tired of it. We sometimes criticize persons who 
do such things by calling them “quitters.” The general point is that one 
doesn’t have the moral right arbitrarily to terminate these ongoing life 
commitments for the sake of (morally) arbitrary fulfillment of personal 
pleasure or avoidance of pain. I think such an argument does not manage 
to show suicide wrong in every case, but it seems likely to be an objection 
at least to some such cases. 
There are two points of disanalogy between the example just presented 
and Kant’s argument that should be made explicit: (1) My example might 
seem to be a violation of a duty to others. I think Kant would reply that 
when we opt out of ongoing duties to others in such a way we also violate 
a duty to ourselves, just because such an opting out seems to reflect a lack 
of moral seriousness, and hence also has an unavoidable self-reference to 
one’s own moral personality. (2) My example concerns the undertaking of 
an optional end. Kant’s argument against suicide in contrast concerns the 
arbitrary termination of goals that were not optional, but obligatory, like 
any Kantian end that is also a duty. Presenting an argument for there be-
ing non-optional moral ends is too big an undertaking for this paper. Let 
me instead just make the point that a life that involved no ongoing moral 
projects, whether optional or obligatory, would be a moral life so minimal 
as to be incompatible with moral excellence. 
This argument makes no reference to teleological laws, and also is en-
tirely different from the structure of the Grundlegung argument. In fact 
there are no such teleological law arguments relating to duties to oneself 
in the Tugendlehre at all. Thus the Grundlegung discussion of suicide with 
which we began is not even very closely related to the later, more detailed 
discussion of the same topic, and the central argument against suicide is 
quite different. The big similarity, which might tend to obscure the differ-
ences between the arguments, is that in both texts Kant does conclude that 
suicide is morally wrong, but the main arguments are quite different. 
In the Tugendlehre teleological language is not entirely absent, but the 
teleology is not natural teleology, but moral teleology. We are to abstain 
from suicide because continued life is an indispensable means to all the 
moral ends of humans, just as, as we will see below, talents are to be de-
veloped because after development they provide indispensable means to 
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certain of our moral ends. There is a reference in Kant’s introduction to 
the topic of duties to oneself (see MdS, VI, 420) to “the impulses of nature 
having do with man’s animality.” The first of these is the one relevant to 
suicide, the impulse through which .....nature aims at [the agent’s] self-
preservation...” (MdS, VI, 420) So the teleological view of human animal 
nature is retained, and is arguably used to set the stage for the final de-
scription of duties to oneself. But still the use of such teleological assump-
tions in specific application arguments does not occur in this later, fuller 
discussion in the Metaphysics of Morals.7
The Tugendlehre argument is more closely approximated by Kant’s 
Grundlegung discussion of suicide in connection with the second formula-
tion of the categorical imperative. There Kant writes,
If he does away with himself in order to escape from a painful situ-
ation, he is making use of a person merely as a means to maintain a 
tolerable state of affairs till the end of his life. But man is not a thing—
not something to be used merely as a means: he must always in all his 
actions be regarded as an end in himself. Hence I cannot dispose of 
man in my person by maiming, spoiling, or killing. (G, V, 429)
 
However, notice that this argument is rather incomplete, since Kant does 
not further explain here how or why the action of suicide is contrary to 
humanity in our own person, as he does in the Tugendlehre.
There is also, it might be thought, a defect in Kant’s reformulation of 
the moral imperative here: “Act in such a way that you always treat hu-
manity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never 
simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.” (G, V, 429) If I 
ask someone at table please to pass the salt, I may seem to be violating this 
formulation, at least unless I simultaneously inquire how his life is, and 
whether there is anything I can do to help him, for failing such additional 
actions I may seem to be using him merely as a means to my having the 
salt. And yet asking someone to pass the salt is normally morally unob-
jectionable. It seems more likely that the second formulation is intended 
to rule out actions that violate the rights of another, or fail to harmonize 
with the wills of others, or, in the case under discussion, if I can speak this 
way, violate the rights of humanity in one’s own person. There are serious 
questions about how we determine what actions would be ruled out or re-
quired of us; sometimes, at least arguably, they could be determined by an 
application of the first formulation of the categorical imperative, though 
that works better for duties to others than for duties to oneself. Ifwe accept 
this interpretation of the second formulation, it does, so far as it goes, sup-
port Kant’s claim of the equivalence of the first and second formulations. 
It would be when we act so as to violate someone’s rights (including our 
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own) or fail to harmonize our action with the will of others and only then 
that by such an action we regard this human being as nothing more than a 
means to our ends, a utensil, as it were. Hence only such violative actions 
would be morally objectionable, under either formulation. Although Kant 
surely believed when he wrote the Grundlegung that the idea of humanity 
grounds rights, the specific nature of that connection remained unclear. 
Until the Tugendlehre structure of ends that are also duties is in place, Kant 
is not well positioned to explain how or why an act of suicide would vio-
late any such right rational agents may have against themselves. 
(3) Let us now turn to the third example, the obligation to develop tal-
ents. Here the first version of the Grundlegung argument is teleological 
in the same way as the discussion of suicide was. The maxim is one of 
neglecting talents for an agent who does not need to develop them to get 
by:
He then sees that a system of nature could indeed always subsist un-
der such a natural law, although (like the South Sea Islanders) every 
man should let his talents rust and should be bent on devoting his life 
solely to idleness, indulgence, procreation, and, in a word, to enjoy-
ment. Only he cannot possibly will that this should become a universal 
law of nature, or should be implanted in us as such a law by a natural 
instinct. For as a rational being, he necessarily wills that all his powers 
should be developed, since they serve him, and are given him, for all 
sorts of possible ends. (G, IV, 423)
The teleological law here is based on the idea that talents are “given” to 
us for our use, and that we are out of harmony with this purposive system 
if we fail to act so as to develop them. And this application reflects the dis-
tinction between contradiction in conception for perfect duties (including 
suicide) and contradiction in the will for imperfect duties. The above criti-
cal comments about the teleological interpretation making Kant’s theory 
of purely historical interest, also apply here. 
When Kant discusses this example in connection with the second for-
mulation he says that our actions must not just not conflict with the end of 
humanity in us; they must harmonize with this end. “Now there are in hu-
manity capacities for great perfection which form part of nature’s purpose 
for humanity in our person. To neglect these can admittedly be compatible 
with the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself, but not with the pro-
motion of this end.” (G, IV, 430) This is very close to the parallel discussion 
of talents that follows the first formulation, and is even more explicit in 
its reference to considerations of natural teleology. For this third example, 
unlike the other three, there is no improvement to be found in the discus-
sion of the issue that comes after the second formulation. 
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In the Tugendlehre, as has been noted above, teleological language is not 
entirely absent, but the teleology found in moral application arguments is 
not natural teleology, where in the present instance the reference would be 
to the end of the talents themselves, or of the projected giver of the talents 
(e.g., God) in giving them to us, but to moral teleology. After saying talents 
are not just to be developed for the sake of personal advantage, Kant adds, 
“Instead, it is a command of morally practical reason and a duty of man 
to himself to cultivate his capacities (some among them more than others, 
insofar as men have different ends) and to be in a pragmatic respect a man 
equal to the end of his existence.” (MdS, VI, 445) Talents are to be devel-
oped because developed talents are important means to the moral ends of 
human beings. For example, one may train to be a nurse with the moral 
aims of becoming self-supporting and helping others. There is a thorough 
analogy with the above discussion of suicide, except, of course, for the fact 
that the suicide duty is a negative duty to abstain, and the talents duty is 
a positive duty to develop. The comments made above concerning suicide 
can be repeated here: the arguments are quite different in Tugendlehre, and 
the Grundlegung argument is less defensible. Also, since they are quite dif-
ferent from each other the Grundlegung argument does not at all accord 
with Kant’s Tugendlehre views.8
IV 
(2) We turn to the lying promise argument, Kant’s second example (G, 
IV, 422). This is an interesting argument, for a number of reasons. First, it 
seems like a good, defensible moral argument, that is very clearly based 
on the universal law principle, unlike those for the duties to oneself. It 
also has the advantage of pretty clearly illustrating what Kant means by 
the contradiction in conception test. In fact Kant at the time of writing the 
Grundlegung seems to have been enormously impressed with this argu-
ment, which for that reason we might think to have been a recent discov-
ery. He not only gives us the example at G, IV, 422; he has already gone 
through the same argument for the same example, also in considerable 
detail, in Chapter One! (G, IV, 402) Toward the end of that chapter, he also 
arrives at the statement of the supreme principle of morality (as he does 
in Chapter Two at G, IV, 420-1)—it will be called the “categorical impera-
tive” only after the requisite terminology has been introduced in Chap-
ter Two—and then gives an almost equally elaborate development to the 
same lying promise example. In addition, he alludes to the lying promise 
argument at two other places where he is looking for a good application 
example: G, IV, 419 and 441.
This argument so impresses him that it appears that the “contradiction 
in conception” test is based on it primarily. (I leave aside perfect duties 
to oneself, also said to be cases of contradiction in conception because the 
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contradiction is more difficult to show there.) For among the other moral 
examples he gives in his works, only one other could be taken to illustrate 
such a test, perhaps: the case of the unreturned deposit (from Critique of 
Practical Reason, V, 27), and even that may not quite be such a case since no 
resistance to making deposits would develop, given that the promisee is 
deceased. In contrast resistance to accepting promises to repay would de-
velop (in the second example argument) after the practice of making lying 
promises became a universal law, as people came to realize that promises 
were no longer reliable indicators of performance.
As wonderful, interesting and impressive as this argument is, it should 
be noted that it has quite a limited scope. Barbara Herman has argued 
quite persuasively in “Murder and Mayhem”9 that the moral obligations 
to refrain from murder and mayhem will have to be imperfect duties, ac-
cording to Kant’s criterion. Such obligations would usually be considered 
to be perfect duties, and so such an outcome seems surprising. If we ac-
cept some other common account of perfect duties such as those duties 
for which there are corresponding rights (J. S. Mill), or those duties which 
are so basic that if they are commonly violated, organized society ceases 
to be possible (H. L. A. Hart), and there is a return to nature, or those 
duties which are legally enforceable by criminal laws, or even those du-
ties that are enforceable and hence fall within Kant’s Rechtslehre, then the 
“contradiction in conception” test applies only to a limited subset of such 
duties, those which, as Herman says, involve some social convention, or 
as I would say, those duties which when violated involve acts that are 
parasitic upon others who are acting differently. What would be some 
other duties that have this character? Some likely instances are the duty to 
pay taxes, the duty not to steal, and perhaps the duty not to cheat in fair 
competitions. 
What happens to such arguments for duties in the Metaphysics of Morals? 
They are no where to be found! Some such obligations, e.g., some prom-
ise-keeping obligations, no doubt get “absorbed” into the Rechtslehre, viz., 
those duties that are legally enforceable, such as the duties based on en-
forceable contracts (see MdS, VI, 220). But this is an example of a perfect 
duty to others, and such duties are not part of the Tugendlehre. And of 
course the account of such duties in the Rechtslehre is quite different. En-
forcement there involves the social provision of non-moral incentives such 
as imprisonment or fines. There are no individual arguments to specific 
moral conclusions, except perhaps for the general argument for property, 
or the argument that capital punishment is the appropriate punishment 
for murder. Kant indicates that agents have a moral obligation to obey the 
law, but the parasitic character of violations is no part of Kant’s argument 
for any duty in the Rechtslehre. In the Tugendlehre, lying, which is perhaps 
related to making a lying promise, is briefly discussed as a duty to oneself, 
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where again the argument is quite different. The passages are not entirely 
clear, but the parasitic character of violations does seem to be a part of 
Kant’s discussion of lies in the late little essay, “On a Supposed Right to 
Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives.” (See Akademie, VIII, 425-30) 
Thus, although this “contradiction in conception” form of argument is 
interesting in its own right, it at best picks out only a limited subset of ex-
ternal, Recht-type obligations to others, leaving out murder and mayhem, 
for example, and probably also enforceable written contracts, and leaving 
only a narrow slice of nonenforceable duties to others: oral, legally unen-
forceable promises, small lies, and wrongful impositions that do not rise 
to the level of legal wrongs. This narrow class is not at all developed in 
Kant’s later, fuller discussion of applications, the Metaphysics of Morals. So 
though it might have seemed to be a promising prelude to the develop-
ment of Kant’s later, most fully worked out theory of moral applications, 
this interesting argument disappears and is not even to be found in the 
Metaphysics of Morals. 
When Kant discusses the lying promise case in the restatement of the 
four examples after the second formulation (G, V, 429-430) he argues that 
making a lying promise entails that the person lied to could not possibly 
share the promisor’s purpose, and that hence a lying promise treats him 
merely as a means to the promisor’s end. He then continues with some 
comments attempting to broaden the scope of this sort of argument:
This incompatibility with the principle of duty to others leaps to the 
eye more obviously when we bring in examples of attempts on the 
freedom and property of others. For then it is manifest that a violator 
of the rights of man intends to use the person of others merely as a 
means without taking into consideration that, as rational beings, they 
ought always at the same time to be rated as ends—that is, only as be-
ings who must themselves be able to share in the end of the very same 
action. (G, IV, 430)
Kant here appears to be asserting that the kinds of action that Barbara 
Herman discusses as examples of murder and mayhem are violations of 
perfect duty to others, and he also makes explicit here the point that such 
actions involve the violation of the rights of others. It may seem, then, that 
the scope of perfect duties to others under the contradiction in concep-
tion test, which derives from the first formulation, is narrower than the 
second formulation test for such perfect duties. We have here again, as 
with duties to oneself discussed above, some evidence of non-equivalence 
between the first and second formulations. But since pursuit of this issue 
is aside from the main aim of this paper, we cannot develop that interest-
ing question further now. 
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Let me make one other point about the lying promise argument. As I 
argued in detail in another essay10 the contradiction in conception has to 
do with the maxim, “To the end of getting money I need, I make a lying 
promise.” The individual liar is successful in getting the desired money 
because of the trust of the loaner, a trust built on promises kept by people 
on other occasions in the loaner’s experience. Ifeverybody is making lying 
promises, the present lying promise will no longer be effective in getting 
money. So we have two contradictory law-like statements: In the indi-
vidual case, the lying promise causes the loaner to hand over the money. 
In the case where everyone has been lying, the lying promise does not 
cause the loaner to hand over the money. This I argued is the contradiction 
Kant is talking about. If this is a correct interpretation, it means that the 
agent’s maxim has internal to it a statement of a means-end relation, and 
that commitment to a maxim involves commitment to an end as well as a 
means. The point, that maxims include ends, is explicit in the Tugendlehre 
(see MdS, VI, 385), but not at all explicit in the Grundlegung. So even for 
the Grundlegung’s lying promise argument the later work must be referred 
to if we are fully to understand the argument for the most characteristic 
moral example of the Grundlegung. 
(4) What about the obligation of mutual aid? (G, IV, 423) This is a good 
example of the contradiction in the will criterion. As stated, it seems not 
as broad as an obligation of universal beneficence, and so again the duty 
under discussion is somewhat limited. The fourth example gives us an 
important argument. It seems based on the factual claim that we are finite 
beings who have needs, and when we actually have such a need, we could 
not will that we not be helped. In contrast, the argument in the Tugendlehre 
for analo gous imperfect duties to others is broader, fuller, and not limited 
to mutual aid, and there is still a different structure of argument, based on 
the other end that is the same time a duty, viz., the happiness of others. 
Further, the Tugendlehre discussion contains such new arguments as the 
idea that I am permitted to be benevolent to myself on the condition of my 
being benevolent to every other as well. (MdS, VI, 451) 
The fourth example is the one that is closest to the counterpart Tu-
gendlehre discussion. Barbara Herman’s essay11 is an authoritative, full 
interpretation of this powerful Grundlegung paragraph; it is based almost 
exclusively on the Grundlegung, and does not mention the characteristic 
Tugendlehre idea of the end that is also a duty. Without going further into 
a discussion of this duty in the Tugendlehre, it could be mentioned that this 
sort of duty is one of the best and clearest applications of the idea of ends 
that are also duties in that work. 
The discussion of the fourth example after the second formulation (G, 
IV, 430) also helps connect the Tugendlehre and the Grundlegung discus-
sions. Kant notes that “the natural end which all men seek is their own 
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happiness,” and we have an obligation to agree “positively with human-
ity as an end in itself For the ends of a subject who is an end in himself 
must, if this conception is to have its full effect in me, be also, as far as pos-
sible, my ends.” (G, IV, 430) Again this seems to indicate a broader duty 
than the same example discussed after the first formulation, and could 
even be read as seeming to hint at the Tugendlehre idea of the happiness of 
others as an end that is also a duty. 
Usually the discussions of the four examples placed after the second for-
mulation are much less attended to in the literature, but I conclude that in 
three out of four instances (Examples 1,2, and 4), those later discussions 
point us better towards and tell us more about Kant’s later and fuller views 
on the application of the categorical imperative, the Tugendlehre doctrine. 
There is also the following difference between the first discussion of the 
fourth example and the discussion of the Tugelldlehre. The former seems 
to depend on a more specific point about human beings and their practi-
cal natures, viz., that we are all beings who can find ourselves in need of 
assistance from others. This rather specific need determines a specific and 
narrow duty of mutual aid. In the Tugendlehre, the basis of discussion of 
duties to others is the end which is at the same time a duty of the happi-
ness of others. The fact that we humans have the end of happiness is a 
consequence of our being finite moral beings, beings not completely self-
contained and self-adequate, beings with needs. This Tugendlehre claim is 
a less specific kind of fact about humans—that we have some needs—and 
is in fact a claim compatible with the proposition that we can each take 
care of our own needs, without assistance. Perhaps this is an advantage of 
the Grundlegung argument: the need claimed there better grounds a more 
specific, narrower, and arguably more important obligation. On the other 
hand the obligation thus justified is narrow and isolated, with little or no 
indication given of how this sample-argument could provide a model for 
other imperfect duties to others. 
Let us here discuss a bit more the contrast between the “contradiction in 
conception” moral test of maxims, and the “contradiction in the will.” (See 
G, IV, 423-4) This is a contrast that specifically arises from examples two 
and four as discussed after the Second Chapter introduction of the first 
formulation of the categorical imperative. We have already seen that the 
contradiction in conception test applies only to a small part of the entire 
range of perfect duties to others (unless we merely define such duties in 
terms of the idea of contradiction in conception). For this reason it does 
not provide a good characterization of the range of perfect duties to others 
according to many of the common preexisting conceptions of such duties, 
so that e.g., they include the duties to refrain from assault, rape, or mur-
der. The idea of contradiction in conception does not help us understand 
any argument against suicide, nor is the idea of contradiction in the will 
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helpful in understanding the proposed obligation to develop one’s talents, 
nor any broader obligation to pursue the happiness of others. This is be-
cause the fourth example argument relies on the obliged agent having a 
potential for experiencing the same need as the person needing assistance, 
whereas such a specific correspondence is no part of the account of our 
obligation to pursue the dutiful end of the happiness of others.
V
Since both of the arguments for duties to oneself contain premises mak-
ing reference to teleological laws, which may not exist, or if they do exist 
do not seem likely to provide a secure basis for uniquely correct claims 
of moral obligation, since laws mentioning competing ends in such pro-
posed laws seem equally plausible, Kant has simply not succeeded in the 
Grundlegung in making a good case for his long-held view that there are 
very significant duties to oneself. Some might say that this is all to the good, 
since this is anyhow an indefensible part of Kant’s theory. Here I’ll only 
comment that to determine adequately such indefensibility, one needs to 
consider the different account of such duties offered in the Tugendlehre, 
which at least makes a better, fuller case than the Grundlegung.12 
Both of the duties to others arguments are good, defensible arguments. 
The one relating to perfect duties to others is based on the categorical im-
perative, first formulation, understood as a principle of justice or fairness, 
and the intuitive moral objection is that maxims that entail a contradiction 
in conception are parasitic on other people acting differently. This model 
argument has a narrower scope of application than one might at first ex-
pect. It does not extend to all perfect duties to others, where that phrase is 
understood as all duties correlated with rights, or all socially enforceable 
duties. The argument of the fourth example is also an argument for a quite 
specific duty, one of mutual aid. It may not be broadly generalizable as a 
model argument, as a sort of reciprocity argument, to a range of other im-
perfect duties to others. Kant in the Tugendlehre in any case does not build 
on this approach, but instead gives an alternative and much more broad 
ranging account of imperfect duties to others, in terms of the end that is 
also a duty of the happiness of others. 
When we turn to the four examples reprised after the presentation of 
the second formulation in the Grundlegung, they do better for us. The ar-
gument for the duty to oneself against suicide comes somewhat closer to 
being cogent, and both of the arguments for duties to others are presented 
in a way that suggests possibilities for their broader generalization. But 
still it is indispensable to consider the more fully worked out versions of 
the application from the Tugendlehre for a full, accurate understanding of 
Kant’s views. And compared to the first traversal of the four examples, the 
second traversals are neglected texts. 
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I have here little to say about why the second traversals in the Grundlegung 
of the four examples should be better and closer to the later, fully worked 
out views of the Tugendlehre. Some might, accepting this point, wish to use 
it to argue for the superiority of the second formulation of the categorical 
imperative over the first. Also, it is perhaps understandable that the first 
traversal has gotten more attention. As first, it is more prominently placed 
in the text than what might have seemed likely to be a mere re-traversal of 
the same ground. Further, there may have seemed to be more interesting 
intellectual challenges to understanding how a “universal law” formula-
tion is to be applied; in contrast the second formulation has seemed to 
many to be fuzzy and unclear. But whatever the explanation, the main 
point remains that the text that has received the greatest attention is the 
least satisfactory indicator of Kant’s final views. 
I conclude that the four examples connected to the “universal law” for-
mulation in the Grundlegung do not deserve the detailed (and isolated) 
attention that has been lavished on them. They do much less to tell us 
Kant’s views about the application of the categorical imperative than 
many other texts, but especially the Tugendlehre part of the Metaphysics of 
Morals, provide. In fact, if one goes to the Metaphysics of Morals expecting 
a simple expansion and development of the ideas presented in Kant’s first 
traversal of the four Grundlegung examples, one is in for quite a number of 
surprises—at least four.13
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